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Differential Privacy of Aggregated DC Optimal Power Flow Data
Fengyu Zhou, James Anderson, and Steven H. Low
Abstract— We consider the problem of privately releasing
aggregated network statistics obtained from solving a DC opti-
mal power flow (OPF) problem. It is shown that the mechanism
that determines the noise distribution parameters are linked to
the topology of the power system and the monotonicity of the
network. We derive a measure of “almost” monotonicity and
show how it can be used in conjunction with a linear program
in order to release aggregated OPF data using the differential
privacy framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
Realistic and publicly available power network models
based on real data are important for the research community.
One of the difficulties in developing such a model is that
grid operators are reluctant to disclose consumer data or any
information that may be commercially sensitive. Differential
privacy, first developed in [1], [2], [3], has been widely
used to evaluate the privacy loss for individual users in a
dataset. It has recently been used by the researchers in the
power systems community for use in applications such as
distributed algorithms for EV charging [4], power system
data release [5], and load management [6].
In our work, we consider the differential privacy of power
systems induced by an Optimal Power Flow (OPF) problem.
In this context, the optimal generation can be viewed as a
function of the loads. Typically generation data is publicly
available. In contrast, load data can reveal consumer habits
and other commercially sensitive information, and thus we
aim to keep it private. We aim to prevent changes in
generation data from disclosing sensitive load data. Instead
of proposing new mechanisms, for a given network we study
how much noise is required to be added to the data in order
to achieve a certain level of differential privacy for existing
mechanisms such as the Laplace mechanism. We introduce
the concept of (δ, ε)-monotonicity, a metric that is central
to our differential privacy analysis. We also show how it
is affected under different system topologies. Finally we
present examples of three systems with different topologies
and thus different monotonic characterizations, i.e., different
(δ, ε) parameters. For each system we show that to preserve
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the same level of differential privacy, the required amount
of noise implied by our theorem is very different for each
example. We hope that such theoretical guarantees will not
only guide the design of differentially private power systems,
but also encourage greater data sharing and cooperation
between grid operators and academia in the future.
We stress that the aim of this work is not to show that
a linear program can be made differentially private. There
are numerous results in this area, see for example [7], [8],
[9]. In the setting we consider, the grid operator will solve
an appropriate optimization problem and will have access
to all the data. The results we provide will be based on
using the Laplace mechanism to release this data privately.
We note that there are other mechanisms available (e.g. the
exponential and Gaussian mechanisms, as well as some that
allow one to specify the support of a distribution) and indeed
some may be better suited for this particular application.
However, the Laplace mechanism is used in this paper
as it most clearly links the key concepts of monotonicity,
sensitivity, and topology and their relationship to privacy -
this dependence has until now not been identified.
II. BACKGROUND
Notation
Vectors and matrices are typically written in bold while
scalars are not. Given two vectors a,b ∈ Rn, a ≥ b
denotes the element-wise partial order ai ≥ bi for i =
1, . . . , n. For a scalar k, we define the projection operator
[k]− := min{0, k}. We define ‖x‖0 as the number of non-
zero elements of the vector x. For X ∈ Rn×m, the restriction
X{1,3,5} denotes the 3 × m matrix composed of stacking
rows 1, 3, and 5 on top of each other. We will frequently use
a set to describe the rows we wish to form the restriction
from, in which case we assume the elements of the set
are arranged in increasing order. We will use em to denote
the mth standard basis vector, its dimension will be clear
from the context. Finally, let [m] := {1, 2, . . . ,m} and
[n,m] := {n, n+ 1, . . . ,m}.
A. System Model
Consider a power network modeled by an undirected graph
G(V, E), where V := VG∪VL denotes the set of buses which
can be further classified into generators in set VG and loads
in set VL, and E ⊆ V × V is the set of all branches linking
those buses. We will later use the terms (graph, vertex, edge)
and (power network, bus, branch) interchangeably. Suppose
VG ∩ VL = ∅ and there are |VG| =: NG generator and
|VL| =: NL loads, respectively. For simplicity, let VG =
[NG], VL = [NG + 1, NG + NL]. Let N = NG + NL.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
3.
11
23
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
7 M
ar 
20
19
Without loss of generality, G is a connected graph with
|E| =: E edges labelled as 1, 2, . . . , E. Let C ∈ RN×E be
the signed incidence matrix. Let B = diag(b1, b2, . . . , bE),
where be > 0 is the susceptance for branch e. As we adopt
a DC power flow model, all branches are assumed lossless.
Further, we denote the generation and load as sg ∈ RNG ,
sl ∈ RNL , respectively. Thus sgi refers to the generation
on bus i while sli refers to the load on bus NG + i. We
will refer to bus NG + i simply as load i for simplicity.
The power flow on branch e ∈ E is denoted as pe, and
p := [p1, . . . ,pE ]
T ∈ RE is the vector of all branch power
flows. The following assumption is made to simplify the
analysis.
Assumption 1: There are no buses in the network that are
both loads and generators. Formally, VG ∩ VL = ∅.
The above assumption is not restrictive under the lossless
assumption in DC power flow. We can always split a bus
with both a generator and a load into a bus with only the
generator connected to another bus with only the load, and
connect all the neighbors of the original bus to that load bus.
B. Optimal Power Flow
We focus on the DC OPF problem with a linear cost
function [10]. That is to say, the voltage magnitudes are
assumed to be fixed and known. Without loss of generality,
we assume all the voltage magnitudes to be 1. The decision
variables are the voltage angles denoted by vector θ ∈ RN
and power generations sg , given loads sl. The DC OPF takes
the following form:
minimize
sg,θ
fTsg (1a)
subject to θ1 = 0 (1b)
CBCTθ =
[
sg
−sl
]
(1c)
sg ≤ sg ≤ sg (1d)
p ≤ BCTθ ≤ p. (1e)
Here, each entry of f ∈ RNG is the unit cost for a generator,
and bus 1 is selected as the slack bus with fixed voltage angle
0. In (1c), we let the injections for generators be positive
while the injections for loads be the negation of sl. The
upper and lower limits for the generation are set as sg and
sg , respectively, and p and p are the limits for branch power
flow. We assume that (1) is well posed, i.e. sg > sg , p > p.
C. Differential Privacy
In this subsection, we introduce the concept of differential
privacy as a method for evaluating the privacy status of
a dataset. In general, a differentially private dataset can
protect the privacy of each individual user by adding noise
to database queries such that the change in a single record
cannot be effectively detected [1], [2], [3]. Suppose Dn is
the data space for n users. Then a data element is d ∈
Dn. A query is a function M˜ : Dn → Rr. Examples
include “count” functions, e.g. return the number of records
in the database where property y holds (r = 1). Other
examples include statistical queries such as computing mean
and variance. A mechanism M : Dn → Rr is a randomized
function of d which releases the result of the query combined
with an appropriately defined level of noise. For example, a
mechanism M can return the value M(d) := M˜(d) + Y
for an appropriately chosen noise Y.
Definition 1 ([1]): The mechanismM is said to preserve
%-differential privacy if and only if ∀d′,d′′ ∈ Dn such that
‖d′ − d′′‖0 ≤ 1, and ∀W ⊆ Rr, we have
P{M(d′) ∈ W} ≤ exp(%) · P{M(d′′) ∈ W}.
A mechanism M that satisfies the properties of Defini-
tion 1 ensures that the addition or removal of a single entry
to the database does not change (much) the outcome of the
query.
The Laplace mechanism is a popular choice relying on the
symmetric Laplace distribution L (·). For a random variable
X ∼ L (b) the probability density function is given by
fX(x|b) = 1
2b
exp
(−|x|
b
)
,
and X has variance σ2 = 2b2. Intuitively, as b increases,
the distribution flattens and spreads symmetrically about the
origin. The Laplace mechanism is defined by M(d) :=
M˜(d) + Y where Yi ∼ L (∆1/%) are independent and
identically distributed for i = 1, . . . , r and ∆1 is the L1-
sensitivity of the query M˜:
∆1 = maximize‖d′−d′′‖0≤1
‖M˜(d′)− M˜(d′′)‖1. (2)
The following theorem explains the importance of the
Laplace mechanism [1]:
Theorem 1: For M˜ : Dn → Rr, the Laplace mechanism
defined by L (∆1/%) provides %-differential privacy.
From the theorem and the definition of the Laplace distribu-
tion, it can be seen that for a fixed privacy level (specified
by %), as the sensitivity increases, the mechanism responds
by adding noise drawn from a distribution of increasing
variance. Fortunately, many queries of interest have low sen-
sitivity; e.g., counting queries and sum-separable functions
have ∆1 = 1,
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. OPF Operator
We now fix the topology and susceptances of the power
network. Let ξ := [(sg)T, (sg)T,pT,pT]T ∈ R2NG+2E be
the vector of system limits. Define
Ω := {ξ|sg ≥ 0, (1b)-(1e) are feasible for some sl > 0}.
For each ξ ∈ Ω, define
Ωsl(ξ) := {sl|sl > 0, (1b)-(1e) are feasible},
Ω˜sl(ξ) := {sl∈Ωsl(ξ)|(1) has NG−1 binding inequalities}.
Here Ωsl is convex and nonempty. When we fix ξ and there
is no confusion, we use Ωsl and Ω˜sl instead.
We now define the operator OPF , which will be used
throughout the rest of the paper.
Definition 2: Let the set valued operator OPF : Ωsl →
2R
NG be the mapping such that OPF(x) is the set of optimal
solutions to (1) with parameter sl = x. 1
We adopt the following assumption to simplify OPF . Fix
B,C and ξ, let Ωf be the set of f such that ∀sl ∈ Ωsl ,
• (1) has a unique solution;
• the Lagrange multipliers of the KKT conditions (Ap-
pendix A, eq.(5)) satisfy
‖µ+‖0 + ‖µ−‖0 + ‖λ+‖0 + ‖λ−‖0 ≥ NG − 1. (3)
Assumption 2: The objective vector f is in Ωf , i.e, f
always guarantees the uniqueness of the solution to (1) for
all sl ∈ Ωsl .
The motivation for Assumption 2 is technical and deferred
to the Appendix.
Remark 1: Under Assumption 2, the value of OPF is
always a singleton, so we can consider OPF(x) as a
function mapping x to the unique optimal solution of (1) with
parameter sl = x. Since the solution set to the parametric
linear program is both upper and lower hemi-continuous [11],
OPF is continuous.
Remark 2: Intuitively, Ω and Ωsl contain the parameters
that make (1) feasible, while Ω˜sl and Ωf also provide OPF
with good properties such as uniqueness and differentiability.
B. System Monotonicity
System monotonicity characterizes how the optimal gen-
eration reacts to a change in load. It sheds lights on the
L1-sensitivity.
Definition 3: A power system is said to be monotone if
∀α,β ∈ Ωsl such that α ≥ β and ‖α− β‖0 = 1, we have
OPF(α) ≥ OPF(β).
In the DC power flow model,
∑
iOPF i(α) =
∑
j αj ≥∑
j βj =
∑
iOPF i(β), i.e., the total generation to meet
demand α is greater than or equal to the total generation
to meet demand β, but the equalities in Definition 3 are
stronger. They are element-wise, i.e., a system is monotone
if all generations will increase or remain unchanged when
any single load increases. This is often too stringent a
requirement. We are interested in approximately monotone
systems, formalized in the following definition.
Definition 4: For δ > 0, ε ≥ 0, a power system is said
to be (δ, ε)-monotone if ∀α,β ∈ Ωsl such that β + δ · 1 ≥
α ≥ β and ‖α − β‖0 = 1, we have
∑NG
i=1[OPF i(α) −
OPF i(β)]− ≥ −ε.We refer to (δ, ε) as a monotonicity pair.
By definition, a monotone system is always (δ, 0)-
monotone for any positive δ. In the next subsections, we will
study the OPF derivative and then relate it to monotonicity.
Here we use the IEEE 9-bus testcase as an example to
illustrate the concept of monotonicity. As shown in Figure
1, increasing the load on either bus 5 (dashed curves) or
bus 9 (solid curves) will lead to production decrease in
generator 2. Thereby, IEEE 9-bus testcase is not monotone.
A more careful analysis shows that for any δ > 0, the system
is actually (δ, 2.01δ)-monotone, meaning the total decrease
1Here, 2R
N
G indicates the power set of RNG .
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Fig. 1. IEEE 9-bus case. Dashed and solid curves show how the optimal
generations change as loads on bus 5 and bus 9 increase. Bus 1 has constant
generation since its generation has reached its upper limit.
in the optimal generation will not exceed 2.01 times the
increase in the load.
C. Determining Monotonicity
Monotonicity as in Definition 3 does not hold for general
networks. In this subsection we characterize topologies that
are monotone. In particular, we show that radial networks
are monotone.
An equivalent definition of monotonicity is that the deriva-
tive2 ∂slOPF(sl) of the corresponding OPF operator is
element-wise nonnegative (when it exists). Let SG(sl) and
SB(sl) denote the set of generators and branches that are
binding, respectively, for a given sl, i.e.
SG(sl) := {i ∈ VG : sgi ∈ {sgi , sgi },
SB(sl) := {e ∈ E : pe ∈ {pe,pe}}.
When there is no danger of confusion, we will write SG and
SB for simplicity.
Assumption 3: The set Ω˜sl is dense in Ωsl . For sl ∈ Ω˜sl ,
the derivative ∂slOPF(sl) always exists, and the sets SG
and SB do not change in a neighborhood of sl.
We show in Appendix B that Assumption 3 is mild.
Returning to the graph G(V, E), we divide E into two
disjoint sets:
E I := {e ∈ E | G(V, E\{e}) is not connected}
E II := E\E I.
Links in E I are called bridges in G. In general, it is possible
that E I = ∅, e.g., when G is a ring. The next result connects
monotonicity to network topology.
Theorem 2: For any sl ∈ Ω˜sl such that SB(sl) ⊆ E I, we
have ∂slOPF(sl) ≥ 0, i.e., the system is monotone.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Thereom 2 directly implies the following corollaries.
Corollary 1: Power networks whose graphs G are trees
are monotone.
2We adopt the following notation: ∂slOPF(sl) := ∂OPF(s
l)
∂sl
= ∂s
g
∂sl
,
which has dimension NG ×NL.
Corollary 2: If all the possible branch flow bottlenecks3
in the power system are in E I, then the system is monotone.
In general, when the cycles in the graph are not adjacent
to each other, the monotonicity pair (δ, ε) can be efficiently
estimated. The algorithm and its proof will be presented in
the journal version of this paper.
IV. OPF PRIVACY
A. Motivation and Definition
Ideally both the generations sg and loads sl are available
for the research community to build realistic power system
models from. However, load data may contain sensitive
information, and hence it is desirable to preserve the privacy
of sl.
Suppose M(sg, sl) is a (randomized) function of (sg, sl),
and acts as the mechanism of the data. It is reasonable
to assume that sg is always chosen as the unique optimal
solution to the OPF problem, i.e., sg = OPF(sl). Then
we can writeM(sg, sl) asM(OPF(sl), sl). For simplicity,
we denote it as M(sl). The privacy problem is to design
a mechanism that hides individual load changes when the
database containing the vectors sg, sl is queried. We let ∆
denote the changes to an individual load, i.e., sli ← sli ±∆
for some ∆ > 0. To address this problem, we introduce a
modified version of differential privacy:
Definition 5: For ∆, % > 0, the mechanism M preserves
(∆, %)-differential privacy 4 if and only if ∀(sl)′, (sl)′′ such
that ‖(sl)′ − (sl)′′‖0 ≤ 1 and ‖(sl)′ − (sl)′′‖1 ≤ ∆, and
∀W ⊆ Rr, we have
P{M((sl)′) ∈ W} ≤ exp(%) · P{M((sl)′′) ∈ W}.
Theorem 1 can be readily extended to our (∆, %)-
differential privacy.
Lemma 1: Let M˜(sg, sl) be a deterministic query. The
mechanism M = M˜ + Y, with Yi drawn i.i.d. from
L (∆1/%), preserves (∆, %)-differential privacy if for any
(sl)′, (sl)′′ such that ‖(sl)′ − (sl)′′‖0 ≤ 1 and ‖(sl)′ −
(sl)′′‖1 ≤ ∆, ∆1 satisfies ‖M˜((sl)′)− M˜((sl)′′)‖1 ≤ ∆1.
B. Queries for Power Systems
We investigated a few commonly used statistics for power
systems provided by U.S. Energy Information Administration
(EIA) [12] and French transmission system operator (RTE)
[13]. Here we list a few of them and view them as the
potential queries for power system data.
• Regional aggregated generation and load: total gener-
ation or load within a region regulated by each grid
operator.
• Power generation by energy source: total generation
provided by each individual source of energy such as
solar or wind.
3We define a bottleneck to be any edge e ∈ E such that ∃sl ∈ Ω˜sl where
the optimal power flow pe ∈ {pe,pe}.
4The definition of (∆, %)-differential privacy in this paper is different
from the standard definition used in [3]. In particular, the second parameter
does not refer to an additive term in Definition 1, but rather a bound on the
`1-sensitivity of the loads.
• Inter-regional flows: power traded among different re-
gions.
Most of those statistics can be regarded as some linear
functions of the generation sg and load sl. In the next
subsection, we will focus on the example of an aggregation
query, which is a generalized model for many statistics listed
above.
C. Aggregation Query
In [14], we propose a method to release load and genera-
tion data in a way that attempts to strike a balance between
the privacy of data owners and the need of the research
community for realistic samples. The method consists of two
steps. First, instead of sg and sl, the data owner releases their
aggregations over discrete regions of the network. Second,
a disaggregation algorithm is used to estimate the loads and
generations based on the released aggregated data. In this
section, we study how differential privacy is preserved for
the aggregation query. See [5] for another approach.
Suppose the buses in V are partitioned into r regions
R1,R2 . . . ,Rr, where Ri ⊆ V is the set of bus IDs in
region i. Let the aggregation query for region i be
M˜gi =
∑
j∈Ri
sgj , M˜li =
∑
j+NG∈Ri
slj ,
The system operator discloses a noisy version of the aggrega-
tion query, denoted asMgi = M˜gi +Y gi andMli = M˜li+Y li .
Here, Y gi and Y
l
i are independent random variables and are
intentionally added to ensure privacy. Let
M(sg, sl) = [Mg1, . . . ,Mgr ,Ml1, . . . ,Mlr]T (4)
be the Laplace mechanism for this aggregation query. Since
the support of Laplace distribution is unbounded, there is
a chance that the mechanism will change the signs of the
query and make the output data unrealistic. In practice, one
can easily use the exponential mechanism to solve this issue
by defining a quality function which penalizes the data with
wrong signs [15]. In this paper we will not provide the details
as space is limited and our primary motivation is to show how
system monotonicity, sensitivity, and topology are related to
the data privacy via the Laplace mechanism. We will see
in Section V that networks that are likely to encounter sign
errors tend to be far from monotone, in which case it is hard
to preserve both the privacy and data quality no matter which
mechanism is applied due to high sensitivity of the system.
Lemma 1 and Definitions 3 and 4 immediately imply the
following two properties of (4).
Theorem 3: Suppose the system is (∆, ε)-monotone. The
mechanism (4) where Y gi and Y
l
i are drawn i.i.d. from
L (2(∆ + ε)/%) preserves (∆, %)-differential privacy.
Proof: By Definition 4, we have
‖(sg)′ − (sg)′′‖1 ≤ ‖(sl)′ − (sl)′′‖1 + 2ε ≤ ∆ + 2ε.
Thus,
‖M˜((sl)′)− M˜((sl)′′)‖1
≤‖(sg)′ − (sg)′′‖1 + ‖(sl)′ − (sl)′′‖1 ≤ 2∆ + 2ε.
Then the conclusion is implied by Lemma 1.
Corollary 3: Suppose the power system is monotone. The
mechanism (4) where Y gi and Y
l
i are drawn i.i.d. from
L (2∆/%) preserves (∆, %)-differential privacy.
Remark 3: The monotonicity pairs for a fixed system are
not unique. In Theorem 3, for any given ∆ > 0, there always
exists ε > 0 such that the system is (∆, ε)-monotone.
Remark 4: For the Laplace distributions given in Theo-
rems 3 and Corollary 3, the level of differential privacy is
independent of how the aggregation regions are divided and
how the data are aggregated. In particular, the amount of
noise required relies on neither the number r of regions nor
the number of buses in each region.
The following example shows why we want the level of
differential privacy to be independent of the region division.
Consider a trivial mechanism which can preserve the same
(∆, %)-differential privacy by adding i.i.d. Laplace noise
drawn from L (∆/%) to each individual load and then
solving an OPF problem with the noisy load data to ob-
tain the generations. This mechanism can guarantee (∆, %)-
differential privacy, assuming that the noisy load makes
OPF feasible and yields a unique solution. Then, from
the central limit theorem, the equivalent noise added to M˜li
would converge in probability to the Gaussian distribution
N (0, 2(∆/%)2|Ri ∩ VL|). The variance of this distribution
depends on the size of the region and can grow rapidly if the
region is large, in comparison to the (equivalent) Laplacian
distribution L (2(∆ + ε)/%) given in Theorem 3. As for
the equivalent noise added to M˜gi , we can give a rough
estimation. Since the noise added to each load is on the
order of ∆/%, the noise vector added to the load vector has
the L1-norm on the order of ∆/%|Ri ∩ VL|. Assume that
(∆, ε)-monotone system can potentially amplify the noise
in the load vector by a factor of roughly 1 + 2ε/∆, the
equivalent noise added to M˜gi could be on the order of
(∆ + 2ε)/%|Ri ∩ VL|, which also depends on the size of
the region and can potentially be quite large.
D. Generalization
In general, for an arbitrary query not necessarily the ag-
gregation query, the L1-sensitivity ∆1 in (2) depends on the
properties of both M˜ and OPF . When M˜ is the aggregation
query, the problem boils down to the monotonicity of OPF ,
as shown in the previous subsection. However, for general
M˜, the estimation of ∆1 may require a more careful analysis
of the structure of M˜. The next result provides a rough
estimation of the required amount of noise for differential
privacy. Its proof is omitted due to space limitation.
Theorem 4: Suppose a power system is (∆, ε)-monotone,
and all elements of the Jacobian matrix JM˜ with respective
to M˜ ∈ Rr are upper bounded by the same constant U .
Then the mechanism M = M˜+Y, where all Yi are drawn
from independent Laplace distribution L (2Ur(∆ + ε)/%),
preserves (∆, %)−differential privacy.
In the aggregation case, U = 1 and r is the number of
regions. Comparing Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, the required
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Fig. 2. The embedded diagram shows the topology of a radial power
network, where black and white nodes indicate generators and loads,
respectively. The double-line edge is the bottleneck of the system, and in
our example, its line flow constraint is always binding. The vertical lines
indicate the ground-truths of the queries for two datasets whose difference
we want to hide. The curves are the probability density functions of the
mechanism outputs that contain Laplace noise.
Laplace noise is reduced by a factor of r in Theorem 3 which
exploits the simple structure of the aggregation function.
V. SIMULATION
A. Radial Network
First, we apply the mechanism (4) to a radial power
network (embedded image in Figure 2), i.e., network with
a tree topology. Corollary 1 implies that the system is
monotone, and by Theorem 3, the noise should be drawn
independently from the Laplace distribution L (2∆/%) so as
to preserve (∆, %)-differential privacy. In this simulation, we
set ∆ = 20 (MW) and % = 0.5. The interpretation is that any
two datasets whose difference we would like to hide should
differ in any one load by at most 20 MW. This example has
been constructed so that the double-line edge in Fig. 2 is a
bottleneck (i.e., a binding constraint in the solution of (1)).
According to Appendix C, this bottleneck splits the tree into
two subtrees and each subtree contains exactly one generator
which is not saturated. Provided the OPF problem remains
feasible, any change in the load will directly lead to the same
amount of change in the generator which resides in the same
subtree as the changing load.
Specifically, if the load on the left increases by ∆, the left
generator will increase its generation by ∆ while the right
generator will remain unchanged. Hence the ground-truths
of the aggregation queries (shown by vertical lines in Fig.
2) are separated by 20 MW, the same as ∆. The density
functions shown in Fig. 2 are sharper than those of networks
with cycles, as shown in Figures 3 and 4.
B. IEEE 9-Bus Network
As we mentioned, the IEEE 9-bus network is (∆, 2.01∆)-
monotone for any positive ∆. We again set ∆ = 20 (MW),
% = 0.5 and divide the system into two regions. In our
simulations, region 1 contains buses 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, while region
2 contains buses 3, 7, 8, 9. Figure 3 shows the probability
density functions for the aggregation mechanism when the
load on bus 9 increases by ∆. The difference between
Ml2(d′) andMl2(d′′) comes directly from the change on bus
9, but the difference betweenMg1(d′) andMg1(d′′) is mainly
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Fig. 3. Differential privacy for IEEE 9-bus case. The vertical lines indicate
the ground-truths, and the curves show the probability distribution of the
mechanism outputs. Only the aggregated generation in region 1 and the
aggregated load in region 2 are presented in the figure.
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Fig. 4. Differential privacy for a ring network, shown in the embedded
diagram. Black nodes represent generators and white nodes represent loads.
The figure shows the density functions of the aggregation mechanism for
different network sizes.
due to the fact that generator 3 has to increase its generation
so as to compensate for the decrease in generation on bus 2.
Hence the distributions forMg1(d′) andMg1(d′′) are further
apart compared to the distributions forMl2(d′) andMl2(d′′).
As a result, to preserve the same level of differential privacy,
the required noise magnitude is greater than what would have
been needed if the system were monotone. The distributions
in Figure 3 are indeed flatter than those in Figure 2.
C. Bad Topology
There are networks whose behavior can be arbitrarily far
from monotone, i.e., they are (δ, ε)-monotone with large ε.
For these networks, differential privacy is only possible with
the addition of large noise, potentially rendering the output
of the mechanism meaningless.
One such network is shown in Figure 4. This network
consists of a cycle with N buses, with generators on two
adjacent buses (black nodes). The branch indicated by the
double-line edge is the only bottleneck where the line flow
constraint is binding. It can be shown that this network is
(∆, (N − 4)∆)-monotone for some positive ∆. This means
that a change in load can be amplified N − 4 times in
some generator, implying a large L1-sensitivity. Figure 4
shows that to achieve (20, 0.5)-differential privacy, a far
bigger noise is required than in the monotone case. As
N increases, the density function becomes flatter. When
N = 40 buses, the density function in Figure 4 is close to
a uniform distribution, i.e., the mechanism hardly discloses
any useful information.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a differential privacy model for OPF
data in power systems. We have introduced the notion of
monotonicity of the OPF operator and used it to determine
the amount of noise needed to preserve differential privacy
for aggregation queries. We have also shown that, for the
aggregation query, the level of differential privacy is inde-
pendent of the number of aggregation regions and the number
of buses in a region. We also derive the required noise level
for arbitrary queries with bounded Jacobian values. Future
work will look at how these results can be applied to the
design of new mechanisms.
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APPENDIX
A. Validating Assumption 2
Let τ ∈ RN+1 be the vector of Lagrangian multipliers
associated with equality constraints (1b), (1c), and (λ+,λ−)
and (µ+,µ−) be the Lagrangian multipliers associated with
inequalities (1d) and (1e) respectively. As (1) is a linear
program [16], the following KKT condition holds at an
optimal point when (1) is feasible.
(1b)− (1e) (5a)
0 = MTτ +CB(µ+ − µ−) (5b)
−f = −[τ 1, τ 2, · · · , τNG ]T + λ+ − λ− (5c)
µ+,µ−,λ+,λ− ≥ 0 (5d)
µT+(BC
Tθ − p) = µT−(p−BCTθ) = 0 (5e)
λT+(s
g − sg) = λT−(sg − sg) = 0, (5f)
where
M :=
[
CBCT
1 0 0 · · · 0
]
is an (N + 1)-by-N matrix with rank N . Condition (5a)
corresponds to primal feasibility, condition (5d) corresponds
to dual feasibility, conditions (5e), (5f) correpond to com-
plementary slackness, and conditions (5b), (5c) correspond
to stationarity [17].
The following Proposition shows that for a fixed network,
it is easy to find an objective vector f such that (1) will
always have a unique solution for a reasonable sl. When
Assumption 2 does not hold, Proposition 1 implies that we
can always perturb f a little such that the assumption is valid.
Proposition 1: Ωf is dense in RNG .
Proof: We first show that for a fixed network (B,C, ξ)
and sl ∈ Ωsl , if the primal optimal solution to (1) is not
unique for some f , then there must exist τ ,µ+,µ−,λ+,λ−
such that (5) holds but (3) does not. Geometrically, an LP has
multiple optimal solutions if and only if the objective vector
is normal to some hyperplane defined by equality constraints
and the set of binding inequality constraints. In our case, the
objective vector [fT,0T]T is a NG +N dimensional vector.
As there are N + 1 linearly independent equality constraints
in (1b), (1c),5 it is therefore enough to take ≤ NG − 2
inequality constraint vectors, along with the above N + 1
to represent [0T, fT]T. That is to say, there exist Lagrange
multipiers that satisfy (5), and there are at most NG − 2
non-zero coefficients in µ+,µ−,λ+,λ−, i.e.,
‖µ+‖0 + ‖µ−‖0 + ‖λ+‖0 + ‖λ−‖0 < NG − 1. (6)
Thereby, (3) implies uniqueness, and we have
Ωf = {f | ∀sl ∈ Ωsl , the solutions of (5) satisfy (3)}. (7)
For S ⊆ [E], T ⊆ [NG] such that |S| + |T | ≤ NG − 2,
we construct Q(S, T ) to be the set of f such that ∃τ ∈
5Here, independence means that the gradient of the equalities (1b) and
(1c) with respect to [(sg)T,θT]T has full column rank N + 1.
RN+1,µ ∈ RE ,λ ∈ RNG satisfying:
0 = MTτ +CBµ (8a)
−f = −[τ 1, τ 2, · · · , τNG ]T + λ (8b)
µi 6= 0⇒ i ∈ S (8c)
λi 6= 0⇒ i ∈ T . (8d)
When S and T are fixed, the vector CBµ takes value
in an |S| dimensional subspace. Since rank(M) = N , the
possible values of τ must fall within an |S|+ 1 dimensional
subspace. Therefore, (8b) implies that f must be in an
|S| + 1 + |T | ≤ NG − 1 dimensional subspace, and hence
interior(closure(Q(S, T )) = ∅. The set⋃
S⊆[E],T⊆[NG]
|S|+|T |≤NG−2
Q(S, T ) (9)
is the union of finitely many nowhere dense sets and thereby
is nowhere dense itself in RNG . On the other hand, (7) and
(8) imply that( ⋃
S⊆[E],T⊆[NG]
|S|+|T |≤NG−2
Q(S, T )
)c
⊆ Ωf (10)
and hence Ωf is dense in RNG .
B. Validating Assumption 3
We first have the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Let Ω˜ ⊆ Ω be the set such that ∀ξ ∈ Ω˜,
the set Ω˜sl(ξ) is dense in Ωsl(ξ). Then Ω˜ is dense in Ω.
The proof is given at the end of this subsection.
We will then validate that the following assumption is
valid.
Assumption 4: The parameter ξ for the limits of gener-
ations and branch power flows is assumed to be in Ω˜, as
defined in Proposition 2.
If Assumption 4 does not hold, Proposition 2 implies
that we can always perturb ξ such that the assumption
holds. When Assumption 2 and Assumption 4 hold, then
Assumption 3 is directly implied by the results given in [18],
[19]. Next, we prove Proposition 2.
Proof: Consider the power equations below:
Tθ :=
[
CBCT
BCT
]
· θ =
 sg−sl
p
 . (11)
Proposition 1 and Assumption 2 show that there will always
be at least NG − 1 binding inequality constraints as each
non-zero multiplier will force one inequality constraint to
be binding. A constraint is binding means some sgi equals
either sgi or s
g
i (as in the upper NG rows in (11)), or some
pi equals either pi or pi (as in the lower E rows in (11)).
We have rank(T) = N − 1. We will first use the following
procedure to construct a new set Ω˜′.
I. Ω˜′ ← Ω
II. For each S ⊆ [NG] ∪ [N + 1, N + E], construct TS .
a) If rank(TS) = |S|, then continue to the next S.
b) If rank(TS) < |S|, then consider
Γ :=
∏
i∈S∩[NG]
{ei, eNG+i}×
∏
j∈[E]
j+N∈S
{e2NG+j, e2NG+E+j} (12)
and update Ω˜′ as
Ω˜′ ← Ω˜′ \
⋃
γ∈Γ
{
ξ|∃θ, s.t. γTξ = TSθ
}
. (13)
III. Return Ω˜′.
In the above procedure, an n-tuple of vectors is also
regarded as a matrix of n columns.6 Since γ ∈ Γ is of rank
|S| and {TSθ|∀θ ∈ RN} defines a subspace with ≤ |S|− 1
dimensions, each set of {ξ|∃θ, s.t. γTξ = TSθ} in (13) is
a subspace with dimension strictly lower than 2NG + 2E.
Using the same technique as in the proof of Proposition 1,
we have that Ω˜′ is dense in Ω. It is sufficient to show that
Ω˜′ ⊆ Ω˜.
In fact, ∀ξ ∈ Ω˜′, if for some sl ∈ Ωsl(ξ), the optimal
solution to (1) has ≥ NG binding inequality constraints, then
we use S ⊆ [NG] ∪ [N + 1, N + E], |S| = NG again to
denote the indices of any NG binding inequality constraints.
As those NG inequality constraints are binding, there must
exist θ ∈ RN and γ ∈ Γ, as defined in (12), such that
γTξ = TSθ. According to (13), rank(TS) must be exactly
NG. Plugging the optimal θ, as well as the binding limits
indexed by some γ ∈ Γ, into (11), we have
γTξ = TSθ (14a)
−sl = T[NG+1,N ]θ. (14b)
For each γ ∈ Γ, as rank(TS) = NG but rank(T) = N−1,
the set {sl | ∃θ, (14) holds} has less dimension than RNL
and is thereby nowhere dense in Ωsl . 7 As a result,
Ω˜sl ⊇ Ωsl \
⋃
γ∈Γ
{sl | ∃θ, (14) holds for γ}
must be dense in Ωsl . Therefore, Ω˜′ ⊆ Ω˜ and Ω˜ is dense in
Ω.
Finally, we have two corollaries of Proposition 2.
Corollary 4: In Proposition 2, Ωsl \ Ω˜sl can be covered
by the union of finitely many subspaces.
Corollary 5: For any sl ∈ Ω˜sl , the NG − 1 binding
inequalities in (1), along with N + 1 equality constraints,
are independent.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
For fixed u ∈ [NL], Assumption 3 shows that there exists
κu > 0 such that ∀ωu ∈ (−κu, κu), sˆl := sl+ωueu satisfies
SG(ˆsl) = SG(sl), SB(ˆsl) = SB(sl). (15)
It is sufficient to show OPF (ˆsl) ≥ OPF(sl) when ωu ∈
(0, κu) for any fixed u.8
6Hence, each γ ∈ Γ can also be regarded as a (2NG + 2E)-by-|S|
matrix.
7It is due to closure(interior(Ωsl )) = closure(Ωsl ). The detailed proof
of this equality is omitted due to space limit
8By symmetry, we will have OPF (ˆsl) ≤ OPF(sl) when ωu ∈
(−κu, 0) for any fixed u.
Since SB ⊆ E I, Proposition 2 implies that |SB ∩ E I| =
|SB|. Thereby SB splits G into |SB| + 1 connected compo-
nents G1, . . . ,G|SB|+1, and each component has vertices Vi
and edges Ei.
We first show that
∀i ∈ [|SB|+ 1], |Vi ∩ ([NG]\SG)| = 1. (16)
Since ∪|SB|+1i=1 Vi = V ⊇ [NG]\SG, and
|[NG]\SG| = NG − |SG|
=NG − (NG − 1− |SB|) = |SB|+ 1,
if (16) does not hold, then there must exist i ∈ [NG] such
that Vi ∩ ([NG]\SG) = ∅ and thus Vi ∩ [NG] ⊆ SG. Now,
for component Gi, power flow equations imply that∑
j∈Vi∩VG
sgj −
∑
j∈Vi∩VL
slj−NG =
∑
e:e∈E,∑
k ∈ Vi
Ck,e=1
pe −
∑
e:e∈E,∑
k ∈ Vi
Ck,e=−1
pe.
(17)
In (17), for j ∈ Vi∩VG, we have sgj ∈ {sg, sg} as Vi∩[NG] ⊆
SG. On the other hand, for e ∈ E such that
∑
k∈Vi Ck,e =±1, e must be the bridge connecting Gi and some other
component, and thereby e is in the cut SB. By definition,
we have pe ∈ {p,p}. Since all the generators and branch
power flows involved in (17) are binding, it contradicts to
Corollary 5 and therefore (16) always holds.
Now let ℵ be the mapping such that ℵ(Gi) is the unique
generator in Vi ∩ ([NG]\SG) for each i ∈ [|SB| + 1]. For
any fixed u ∈ [NL] and ωu ∈ (0, κu), we will prove
that OPFv (ˆsl) ≥ OPFv(sl) for each v ∈ [NG] by
discussing the following three possible situations that may
arise. Assume u+NG ∈ Vk for k ∈ [|SB|+ 1].
• If v ∈ SG(sl), then (15) implies v ∈ SG(ˆsl) as well.
Since OPF is continuous over ωu ∈ (−κu, κu) and
sg < sg , there must be OPFv (ˆsl) = OPFv(sl).
• If v = ℵ(Gk), then similar to (17) we have∑
j∈Vk∩SG
OPF j(sl) +OPFv(sl)−
∑
j∈Vk∩VL
slj−NG
=
∑
e:e∈E,∑
l ∈ Vk
Cl,e=1
pe −
∑
e:e∈E,∑
l ∈ Vk
Cl,e=−1
pe
=
∑
j∈Vk∩SG
OPF j (ˆsl) +OPFv (ˆsl)−
∑
j∈Vk∩VL
sˆlj−NG
(18)
As sl and sˆl only differ at load u and OPF j (ˆsl) =
OPF j(sl) for all j ∈ Vk ∩ SG as shown above, (18)
can be simplified to
OPFv (ˆsl)−OPFv(sl) = sˆlu − slu = ωu > 0,
and therefore OPFv (ˆsl) > OPFv(sl).
• If v = ℵ(Gk′) for some k′ 6= k, then (18) still holds for
Gk′ but sl and sˆl are identical for loads in Gk′ . Hence
we have OPFv (ˆsl) = OPFv(sl).
Putting this together, we conclude that OPFv (ˆsl) ≥
OPFv(sl) for all v ∈ [NG].
